ACADEMIC FREEDOM IN THE UNITED STATES
ERN'EST VAN DEN HAAG*

I
AcADEmIc FREEDoM AS APRoFssoRmA PRIVILEGE
In Europe, academic freedom usually protected the whole campus from ecclesiastical and government interference. On many campuses police were not allowed
without academic consent. This extensive protection was needed, for neither

professors nor students were guaranteed freedom as subjects of church and state.
Yet the function of the university requires that professors be free to form and profess
independent views, and students to learn from them. Hence the privilege of
academic freedom.
In the United States, freedom is not an academic privilege; it is a right constitutionally guaranteed to all residents. Academic freedom is needed exclusively to
protect the independence of professors from trustees, colleagues, administrators,
students, alumni, and public opinion. Thus academic freedom in the United States
is an intra-academic privilege which secures the independence of professors as
employees, so that they may perform their professional tasks.
The immunities which constitute academic freedom go beyond those required by
the American Constitution as do the qualifications and obligations of faculty members.
Extra-constitutional obligations and privileges, of course, inhere in employment and
in professional status. There is no constitutional obligation to sell brushes, or fill
teeth. Salesmen and dentists waive their constitutional right not to do so. On the
other hand, there is no constitutional right to extract appendices or electrocute people.
Physicians and executioners are granted these privileges in view of special qualifications and employments. Academic freedom is an analogous extra-constitutional
privilege granted no longer to, but by, institutions of higher learning to their researchers and instructors. There is no constitutional right to university employment.
Academic freedom is an extra-constitutional, intra-academic privilege which protects
professors not against legal punishment but against threats of dismissal arising from
the fulfillment of their duty to form and profess their views independently.
Students benefit from the academic freedom of the faculty and perhaps from
the atmosphere of freedom which should prevail on a campus. So does society at
large. However, students do not have academic freedom. Controversial student
activities may be permitted on educational grounds (or expediency: prohibition may

be more harmful than permission), on grounds of wisdom, or as a general university
policy (the "or" is not necessarily disjunctive)-but academic freedom is not involved.
*M.A. 1942, State University of Iowa; Ph.D. 1952, New York University. Adjunct Professor of
Social Philosophy, New York University; lecturer, The New School for Social Research.
' I am aware of occasional extra-academic pressures. But they are effective only if the university
authorities are willing to translate them into internal pressure.
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Just as law or medical students may one day share the privileges of the profession
they are preparing to enter, so other students may, if they become instructors, share
the privileges of the faculty. As students, they do not. Unless delegated, the
privilege of inviting speakers to the campus is vested in the faculty and administration,
not in the students. They are members of the academic family-but it is the faculty
that stands in loco parentis.
Teachers in secondary and primary schools, deans, janitors, editors, and administrators all are as free as the constitution and their employment contracts make them,
but they do not have academic freedom. For this privilege is meant to secure the
independence of scholars, presumed to be qualified to do their own research and
teach what they have found. Teachers in secondary and primary schools are not
hired to conduct research and need not be qualified to do so. Their major task is to
transmit received knowledge as prescribed by the curriculum. I should urge increasing their freedom to decide what to teach, when, and how. I think it likely
that teachers free to express competent opinions will be better teachers. But these
are matters of expediency and educational effectiveness, not claims to academic
freedom. Teachers have no such claim either historically or as a professional
requirement. A modicum of employment security is probably as helpful for teachers
as it is to other occupations. But only scholars need academic freedom to fulfill
their professional obligations.
The qualifications of scholars are recognized in the main by other scholars.
Usually the primary and frequentiy the decisive recommendation for employment or
promotion is made by the departments familiar with the candidate's scholarly work,
and passed upon by a variety of university authorities. The candidate's qualifications
generally include competence in specific fields, general intelligence, a warranted belief
that he will contribute to human knowledge, honesty, independence, and perhaps
discretion. These qualifications pertain to academic employment as does academic
freedom. Citizens are allowed to lie (except under oath); and to plagiarize works
in the public domain; and to believe that W. A. Mozart discovered America, and
Lysenko the inheritance of acquired characteristics. But academic employment,
protected by academic freedom, requires competence and the waiver of the exercise
of the constitutional rights to foolishness, ignorance, or deceptiveness (at least to
some degree), and, finally, the assumption of extra-constitutional duties.
It is easier to describe the qualifications for academic employment than to
positively establish their presence. They are not measurable. Disqualifications are
more easily established. Mediocrity usually does best. The practical effects of
'Max Planck commented, on the reception of his Ph.D. thesis at the University of Munich in

879:

"I found no interest, let alone approval, even among the very scientists who were closely related to the

" Quoted by Leo Rosten in The Creative Idea, 64 TEACHERS COLLEGE RECORD, 637, 641 (x963).
topic ..
(His thesis contained highly original, important, and often correct propositions.) New ideas, and those
who profess them, are usually received coldly.

Tycho Brahe never ceased opposing Copernicus; and the

history of science discloses that originality is seldom well received. Certainly the system by which we
establish qualifications for professorships is very bad-but it is the best devised so far.
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academic freedom-increased job security-protect incompetents and competents
alike once they have acquired tenure.3 Since attempts to make it easier to get rid
of incompetents make it easier also to dismiss competent professors, the net
effects are unlikely to be desirable-the protection of incompetents is an unavoidable cost of academic freedom. Another objection to academic freedom is that
professors who instead of teaching the "right," "good," and "true" teach "wrong,"
"wicked," and "untrue" ideas are protected as well. Yet someone has to decide
what is "right," "good," or "true." The members of the faculty do. And there
is no reason to believe that an outside authority would know or do better-or
would be less vulnerable to the accusation of heresy. Indeed, one may define
academic freedom as a system that locates in the faculty the main power to decide
what is "right," "good," and "true" enough to be taught 4 Where an outside body
has this power, academic freedom is limited de facto by the tolerance of this outside
authority; de iure it does not exist.

II
THm Ex=NT oF PROTECON
Not only is it hard to establish in practical terms who qualifies for it-the notion
of academic freedom itself leaves some areas vague. Are utterances outside one's
special field of competence protected, and outside the academic context (e.g., in a
letter to newspapers) ? To what extent can the university insist on honesty in matters
not directly relevant to academic tasks, and on discretion, and what about rules
of personal conduct?
I am inclined to hold that academic freedom should protect a professor even
when he comments on matters outside his special field, and regardless of context. Else
the effect of academic employment would be severely, undesirably, and unnecessarily
restrictive. Yet it is hard to see how the exercise of the professor's right to free
speech could be inconsistent with his academic duties.
It follows that a professor of chemistry is entitled to profess heterodox views on
religious, political, or sexual matters. However much these views displease the university, he cannot be dismissed for professing them, unless he does so in the classroom
instead of teaching chemistry. (But in this case he might be fired even if he
professed orthodox views.) Needless to say, academic freedom automatically protects a psychologist who expresses dissident views on sexual matters or a social
scientist who expresses dissident views on social matters, whether in the course of his
teaching or not. The chemistry professor need not renounce his rights as a citizen;
the psychologist or social scientist is protected in professing his professional views.
All, however, would violate their academic duties if they were to use their positions
'Though less strong, academic freedom resembles the protection of the judiciary but not that of
civil servants. The latter are protected for the sake of efficiency and personal security, whereas academic
freedom aims at protecting independence.
'This power must be largely, though not exclusively, in the hands of the individual members of the
faculty, rather than the body as a whole.
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to recruit for the practice of particular beliefs, or for organizations favoring them.
(And that violation is most likely to be noted ceterisparibusif the belief is heterodox.)
And all may be expected to exercise reasonable caution in not associating the university with their personal views.
Thus, prima fade academic freedom was violated if, as the newspapers had it,
the University of Illinois fired an instructor in i96o because he expressed unorthodox views on sex in a letter to the student paper. Mr. Leo Koch's shopworn
utopia scarcely commands sympathy. (He proposed reducing extra-marital sexual
relations among students to cathartic gymnastics drearily-but sanitarily-performed
under university auspices.) Yet he would not have been dismissed had he expressed
he was fired for professing dissident
himself in favor of pre-marital chastity. Thus
4"
violated.
was
freedom
views. Academic
A case for the dismissal could be made in terms of lack of discretion. Mr. Koch
must have known that in the United States universities are to some extent custodial
institutions; at the least, they take some responsibility not only for scholarship and
intellectual matters but also for the conduct and the morality of students. His letter
to a student paper might well be understood by students, and more likely by their
parents, as an authoritative expression of proposed university educational policy.
Never mind that it was not meant that way. Mr. Koch should have foreseen the
potential harm his letter would cause the university-a harm clearly not offset by
any potential scientific or practical merit. If he was unable to understand these
likely effects, or deliberately disregarded them, he might not be intelligent enough
or discreet enough for his position. A case may be made along these lines. But
it does not seem strong enough to justify dismissal out of hand.
III
THE PRtcAuousN.ss oF PROTECTION

Mr. Koch's dismissal is interesting because it suggests the vulnerability of
American universities, and the consequent precariousness of the academic freedom
they grant. Unlike European institutions, American universities have a strong inclination to expand. They depend, therefore, on an ever increasing student body, and
on ever increasing grants of money from ever increasing numbers of donors. Hence
American universities tend to cater to prospective donors-more specifically state
legislatures, alumni, wealthy persons, and students-far more than European universities. Administrators will hesitate to permit anything that might reduce public
support and therewith the expansion potential of the university. The very fact that
in American universities ultimate power is vested largely in trustees and administrators-usually representatives of the extra-academic world-rather than in faculties
causes academic freedom to be a grant by these powers to the faculty, and not a part
of the faculties' self-regulation, as it is in Europe.
'a

Koch v. Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois, 39 11. App. 51, 187 N.E.2d 340 (x963).
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The perfect solution of this problem would be an institution that manages to live
on its permanent endowment. Yet, the less than perfect solution of the problem that
is actually practiced-largely reliance on a multiplicity of money sources-seems to
have impaired academic freedom very little.
The idea that government financing is particularly dangerous is certainly not
borne out by the European experience. And in America, a government financed
judiciary is quite independent-particularly when life tenure is assured.
The main danger to academic freedom is not actual outside interference, but
an inside desire to please, motivated in part by the actual or presumed need of the
institution for the good opinion of those who might support it financially. In the
United States, neither people nor institutions like to be out of step with public
opinion. Universities thus care for their public image; and departments, and
professors, for popularity. This tendency, too, may lend support to restrictions and
violations of the academic freedom of those who might exercise it to profess views
that-however legitimate-do impair the institutions' "public relations."
Certainly restriction of academic freedom cannot be measured by the number
of cases publicly debated. Prevenient restriction-the semiconscious adoption by
professors, chairmen, and administrators of standards they believe will not offend
public opinion-is probably more important, and it is not measurable Prevenient
restriction, which makes selection and promotion depend on criteria other than
professional qualifications-all too often on conformity to current academic or social
fashions-has restricted academic freedom far more than formal outside threats to it.
IV
COMMUNISTS

Does academic freedom require or permit the dismissal of faculty members who
are also communists? Those who favor retention argue that academic freedom permits dismissal only when a violation of standards of honesty or competence can be
shown to have been committed by the communist faculty member. The argument
takes various forms.
Sometimes it is argued that to dismiss a man merely because he is a communist
abridges his right, as a citizen, to be one. But the question is not whether he can be a
communist and a citizen but whether he can be a communist and a faculty member.
As has been noted, what is allowed to the citizen may disqualify the faculty member.
Another argument holds that to expel communists without a showing of specific
violations is to regard them as guilty by association. However, communists are
people who-whether they associate with other communists or not-are committed
'In PAUL F. LAZARSFELD & WAGNER THIELFNS, JR., THE ACADEMIC MIND (1958), the authors
attempted to measure something of the kind during the McCarthy episode. In my judgment, they
failed. (See van den Haag, Book Review, McCarthyism and the Professors, Commentary, Feb. 1959,
P. 179). They didn't establish whether there was an actual increase of restriction, or of fear of restriction; nor did they find out whether professors were more fearful than usual, and if so, whether this
was due to more actual danger or to more sensitivity to it, or to more anxiety otherwise generated.
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to sharing the aims of the Communist Party and to follow its instructions. It is not
their associations, but this commitment, which is questionable.
Similarly, it is argued that even a communist must be regarded as innocent until
proven guilty of specific violations. But procedures with regard to the retention of
employees or members of the scholarly community cannot be analogous to those of
criminal law. The criminal law looks backward. A man is guilty if he has violated
the law-regardless of his future promise; and he is innocent if he cannot be demonstrated to have violated the law in the past, regardless of how well we know that
he will do so in the future. But employment is concerned with the future. The
past is relevant only in as much as we can infer from it upon the future. A commitment to violate academic standards in the future would be more relevant than any
past action.
The legal analogy for dismissal proceedings, which is not found in criminal courts,
might be sought in the procedures used to establish cause for legal separation, or
annulment of marriage. (However, university authorities cannot proceed quite like
a court, for they lack its power; they do not dispose of police and cannot subpoena
witnesses or compel sworn testimony.) Suppose a husband has committed his
affections outside of wedlock. Letters to his mistress are found, assuring her of his
total devotion and promising to follow her instructions for adultery and for poisoning
his wife. The husband admits the correspondence and refuses to give up his
mistress. But he protests that he has not been proven guilty except by association;
he has not been caught in the act of poisoning, nor is the correspondence sufficient
proof that his relations with the other woman are not platonic. Thus, he maintains,
separation would be undue punishment, for his wife keeps him in comfort while
the mistress has no money.
A court might find the evidence insufficient to establish criminal guilte But can
one doubt that a separation would be granted? Yet, whether devotion to one woman
excludes or even diminishes devotion for another, whether a mistress is compatible
with marriage depends in practice on the personalities and social conditions of
those involved. But that commitment to independence and surrender of independence are mutually exclusive is not open or dependent on social conditioning.
Since academic freedom is a promise not to dismiss professors for forming and
professing independent views, it presumes that the professors themselves are committed to form and profess their views independently. But communists are committed not to. They claim academic freedom only to protect their own surrender
of it. That much is no longer open to doubt7 But many professors doubt that it
suffices to dismiss the communists among them.
'Actually, to find a party guilty in a divorce proceeding, no court requires more than that the party
be shown to have been in a highly compromising situation; proof of unfaithfulness beyond this is not
required, proof of the present intent and opportunity being sufficient.
' See SIDNEY HooK, HERESY, YEs-CoNsiRAcy, No! (953); Hook, The Ethics of Academic Freedom,
in Ac.ADrmc FREEDom, Looc, AND REaLoIoN 19 (Am. Philosophical Ass'n, 1953); Hook, Indoctrination
and Academic Freedom, The New Leader, March 9, 1953, p. 2; Hook, Freedom in American Culture, id.,
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Professor Fritz Machlup, a brilliant economist and a convinced libertarian, correctly points out that the obligation of professors is "to search for truth and speak
the truth as they see it."' But he does not see that this obligation is incompatible
with commitments such as to "at all times take a position on every question that
is in line with the policies of the party,".9 "to take advantage of their position without
'
exposing themselves,"' ° to "display thorough readiness to accept party discipline," "
"to carry out orders,"'" to "carry out all decisions of the party,"'" and to "skillfully inject [the party-line] into their teaching at the least risk of exposure. ' 14
Now, these commitments, which in practice involve commitments to recruit, to
spy, to recruit spies, to help promote other party members and to hinder party
opponents regardless of academic merits, seem clearly incompatible with academic
office. However, Machlup insists "... . we cannot make party membership a decisive
criterion."'" Rather we have to demonstrate that these communist commitments
were actually carried out, or, at least, that the party member committed himself
knowingly. This idea seems based once more on an erroneous identification
of criteria of criminal justice with criteria for professional or employment disqualification.
Moreover, the kind of evidence Machlup requires to dismiss a communist could
not be obtained without actually impairing academic freedom: one would have to
send spies to the classroom or ask students to tell whether the professor has engaged
in communist activities. (I'd rather not.) Yet the commitment to do so seems
quite enough: a bank cashier who joins a gang of bank robbers and promises to follow
the orders of the gang leader and help rob his bank as soon as feasible, certainly
6
need not be retained, even if he has not, or not yet, carried out his commitment.
To commit oneself to surrender one's independence is ipso facto to disqualify
oneself for academic office. To do so without having carried out the commitment,
or having been shown to have done so, certainly does not justify confidence in the
future action of the communist professor. And it is the future that we are concerned
with. He may lack courage or opportunity to carry out his party obligation and
April 6, 1953, p. S2; Hook, Logic and the Filth Amendment, id., Oct. i, r956, p. 12; Hook, Ethics
and the Filth Amendment, id., Oct. 15, 1956, p. 16; van den Haag, The Communist Teacher Can't Be
Free, id., May 25, 1953, P. 12; van den Haag, Academic Freedom and Its Defense, in STRENGTHENING
EDucArToN AT Ax LEvELs 14 (Am. Council on Education, 1953); van den Haag, Student Loyalty,--

Should It Be Questioned? Yes, The New Leader, Feb. 2, ig6o, p. 16.
"Academic Freedom, Time, May io, 1963, pp. 71, 73.

" Resolution, 9th Convention, Communist Party U.S.A. (1936).
"oThe Communist, May 1937, p. 63.

" 1d., Sept. 1938, p. 8o8.
" See testimony of Earl Browder in Hearings Before the House Special Committee on Un-American
Activities on Investigation of Un-American Propaganda Activities in the United States. 7 6th Cong., ist
Sess. 4417 (1939).

'a Ibid.
"The Communist, supra note xo.
1

Time, May 1o, 1963, P. 73-

x'It seems to me that his mere refusal to repudiate the gang and to help the authorities apprehend it,
raises doubts as to his fitness to remain a bank cashier.
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violate his academic one; or perhaps he did carry out party instructions so well
and secretly that he cannot be shown to have done so. At any rate, having committed
himself to violate academic standards appears decisive to me, regardless of the professor's skill, ability, or courage in carrying out his commitment and the presence or
lack of opportunity to do so.
Perhaps some professorial party members did not fully realize what they were
committing themselves to. They lacked mens rea. This keeps a man out of jail
(though the question of culpable neglect may be raised). But it disqualifies him
from academic employment: a man who commits himself in such a matter without
knowing or finding out what he is doing is too ignorant, irresponsible, or stupid to
instruct students3P
Professors, like anyone else, may be intellectually committed to such beliefs as
Presbyterianism, atheism, Roman Catholicism,"8 Republicanism, liberalism, conservatism, vegetarianism, idealism, materialism, pluralism, or absolutism. Such
beliefs do not disqualify them as professors so long as no commitment to follow
orders, recruit, or misuse their office-in short give up their independent research in
favor of a party line-is involved. It is their commitment to give up their independence that disqualifies communists, and it disqualifies them regardless of their academic
specialization, for they are committed to misuse any academic office.
It is sometimes argued that we can rely on the good sense of students and need
not "fear" communists. Most students have good enough sense not to become
communists, as do most professors; but some do not. After all, the professors
formerly were students. A university would be irresponsible in permitting the
infection of students-not all are immune-by professors known to be infected.1 9
Moreover, the professor who has committed himself to a totalitarian organization
is out of place in a university, simply because, unlike his colleagues, he has surrendered
his academic freedom.
V
FELLOW TRAvEL as

What about people who may be members of the Communist Party but do not
admit as much; and what about sympathizers?
"' If a man repudiates his party membership, all we need be interested in are his qualifications for
future service. I am addressing myself here to those who insist that a continued commitment-or lack
of evidence that it has ceased-is no obstacle to continued academic office.
"sRoman Catholics are sometimes suspected of depending on ecclesiastical instruction in carrying out
the duties of public or academic office. It should be noted however that Canon law requires catholics to
fulfill the duties of the office they assume, and that American experience with Catholic judges, governors
and presidents indicates that there is no parallel with communists, and nothing like a party-line on any
scientific questions. Occasionally catholics, of course, may be fanatics-as may vegetarians. A fanatic is
not competent to teach even if he is a fanatic liberal. But in considering academic employment we can
discriminate in terms of: (a) how harmful the belief fanatically pursued is (vegetarianism will hardly
be as harmful as communism); (2) whether the fanatical pursuit leads to academically improper
behavior, e.g., grading students according to their attitude toward vegetarianism or rating colleagues
in these terms. Here political fanaticism seems worse than other kinds.
" The argument that communists are needed to teach communism hardly warrants a reply. We do
not usually think that you have to have the disease, the virtue, or the vice to be a competent student of it.
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As for suspected members, ordinary means of finding out-interrogation, testimony, and the possible conformity and simultaneity of changes in their views with
changes in the party-line-must be used. The relevant issue is whether they hold or
change views because of independent research and reflection-or whether the stimulus
comes from the party-line.
Refusal to testify as to his actions, beliefs, and commitments certainly is inconsistent with the function of any university professor. A person invoking the fifth
amendment to refuse to answer a question by a committee of Congress should not
ordinarily be regarded as fit to hold academic office. If he fears genuinely to incriminate himself by answering freely, he can hardly be fit to teach freely. If he
does not, he has no right to invoke the fifth amendment, and his misuse certainly
disqualifies him. But here, though I should defend the principle, I should like
to look at each individual case before making a decision. I can imagine circumstances where the legal right to stand mute is invoked, and the invocation is not
inconsistent with academic office. However, the burden of proof is on the unresponsive witness.
Sympathizers are people not fully committed to the Communist Party but willing
at times to help it. Since theirs is not a definite commitment, by definition (otherwise
they would be crypto-communists) they must be treated according to their actions.
If there is cumulative evidence that their sympathies have led them to actions contrary to academic standards, they must be treated accordingly. If their views show a
lack of competence, again, action must be taken accordingly. But if neither is the
case, the mere outrageousness of their views is not ground for dismissal.2 °
I apologize for discussing communist teachers at such length-it should not be
necessary. Unfortunately, it is. The academic community finds it unduly hard
to distinguish communists from liberals-and is indignant when outsiders thereupon
find it hard to distinguish liberals from communists. Thus, a few years ago a
number of major universities insisted-in the name of liberty and academic freedoml
-on depriving their students of the opportunity to borrow money from the federal
government, because such loans were conditioned on the borrowers stating under
oath that they were loyal to the Republic and did not support organizations attempting to overthrow it by unconstitutional means. These universities seriously contended that they had to protect their students from the danger of swearing loyalty
to our form of government! Of course, such oaths (which rather than being a
novelty, as many people believe, are a tradition in American history) are useless.
(So are commencement exercises.) Yet demanding or swearing them is not evilwherefore I can see no positive objection to it. Again, various states have asked
professors to swear similar oaths. They have been resisted, at times, by noncommunist professors, whose courage I admire far more than the cause for which
it is employed. If it makes legislators feel better that I swear that I am not a
20Sidney

Hook has brilliantly illuminated this point in his book, HEmasy, YEs-CONsPIRAcy, Nol, op. cit.

supra note 7.
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communist and I am not, I certainly can see no reasonable objection to swearing to
what is true.
What underlies the resistance of many faculties and administrations is a vague
feeling that academic freedom includes the right to be a communist-even if they
do not exercise it. For, it is argued, one is not free unless one has a right to hold any
intellectual conviction. To be sure. But all freedom is limited by duty. A professor
is free to hold any intellectual conviction, even, perhaps, the conviction that he
should give up his freedom. But he is not free to give it up-and remain a professor.
He is not free to act on this conviction. The distinction between acts, including
organizational commitments and conspiracies, and convictions has a long history
in law. Academic freedom cannot be protection for action to surrender it, or for
a promise (also an act) to do so. It is time that the academic community accepted
John Stuart Mill's dictum: "The principle of freedom cannot require that he should
be free not to be free. It is not freedom to be allowed to alienate his freedom."

